cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/31275330
The rise of Chinese private security companies in Myanmar will reshape conflict dynamics. This report to the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries highlights how such companies are proxies for the Chinese State, importing authoritarianism, intensifying militarisation, undermining human rights, and exploiting legal loopholes to operate with impunity.
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Since Myanmar’s 2021 coup, widespread human rights abuses have underscored urgent concerns about the role of foreign private security companies (PSCs), most of which are from China. This report examines the human rights implications of Chinese PSCs operating in Myanmar, not merely as commercial actors but as State-connected forces blurring the line between private security and military intervention. This analysis focuses on how these actors undermine civil and political rights and how their unchecked power exacerbates the nation’s human rights crisis. We present our findings to inform the United Nations OHCHR Work Group on the Use of Mercenaries’ inquiry into the impact of mercenaries and private military and security companies.
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The legal framework provides only vague guidelines on the use of force. While the Penal Code (1861) requires that any private use of force be proportionate (Art. 99), its provisions do not prevent excessive force in practice. The Private Security Service Law (2025) allows PSCs to detain offenders, but its only reference to the use of force is that PSCs may defend themselves under the Penal Code (Arts. 28.v-vi), leaving room for inconsistent practices and potential abuse in volatile settings.
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Chinese economic interests are deeply entwined with Myanmar’s strategic landscape, notably through the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key pillar of China’s global Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). What began as a series of infrastructure projects has evolved into a broader effort to secure China’s supply chains, energy security, and regional influence. As Myanmar’s State capacity has collapsed, the security risks to these investments have surged, directly impacting the human rights of local populations.
Chinese interests have suffered collateral damage in conflict zones across Myanmar. At least 23 of 34 Chinese infrastructure projects are located in areas marked by instability, including Rakhine, northern Shan State, and the central lowlands.[8] Incidents, such as the seizure of a Chinese-owned nickel processing plant in Sagaing[9] and the occupation and subsequent burning of the Alpha Cement factory in Mandalay, underscore the vulnerability of these investments.
Moreover, public perceptions of China’s support for the military have provoked targeted attacks, with 32 factories allegedly damaged in the months following the coup, amounting to losses of US$37 million. Such violence not only endangers property but also directly threatens the right to a safe, secure environment.
In response to escalating security challenges, China has increasingly pressed all actors for greater protection of its assets. This pressure has led to disproportionate measures by the military, including the imposition of martial law, harsh crackdowns that have claimed at least 22 protesters’ lives, and punitive 20-year sentences for at least 28 campaigners. High-profile incidents, like the October 2024 bombing of the Chinese consulate in Mandalay, show that anti-China sentiment remains high. Consequently, China’s demand for robust security mechanisms has grown, prompting an expansion of Chinese PSCs in Myanmar.
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When the military seized power in 2021, six of the nine registered foreign PSCs in Myanmar were Chinese. These companies, tasked with protecting CMEC projects and Chinese personnel, offer services from static guarding to surveillance and risk assessments, particularly in areas where Chinese assets face local resistance.
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Chinese PSCs as proxies of the Chinese government
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China remains fundamentally aligned with the Myanmar military, operating under the belief that a military victory will best serve its broader economic and strategic objectives. Even as the military loses territorial control, it continues to dominate key urban centres, infrastructure, and economic zones vital to Chinese business. Through arms shipments, infrastructure investments, and security cooperation, China backs the military, indirectly contributing to severe human rights abuses, including threats to life, liberty, and due process.
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